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Abstract:  The growth-enhancing property of a well-functioned judicial system is 
documented on the back of the safeguarding of property rights and legal investor 
protection, the well-functioning of financial markets, the support to entrepreneurship 
and the upholding of the firm growth. We investigate the effects of judicial efficiency 
on economic growth, using a new dataset over the period 2010-2018 drawn by the EU 
Justice Scoreboard study. More specifically, we estimate a static growth equation 
controlling for alternative judicial efficiency measures. Our findings corroborate that 
the inefficiencies in the operation of judicial systems pose obstacles to economic 
growth, and consequently, positive developments in judicial efficiency can be growth 
enhancing. Specifically, inefficiencies in the operation of judicial systems, measured 
alternatively as (a) lengthier court proceedings, (b) lower rates of clearance of 
accumulated unresolved cases, (c) increasing burden of pending cases and (d) a high 
inflow of new cases, all undermine economic growth. Our results justify the further 
adoption of judicial reforms in European Union members, that strengthen the 
enforcement of private contracts, incentivizing the domestic and external investment 
decisions and supporting the European economies to achieve and sustain robust growth 
rates. Finally, we find that civil origin legal systems, which are characterized by a 
higher degree of formalism in judicial procedures relative to common law origin 
systems, hinder economic growth.  
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1. Introduction  
Cross-country variations in economic growth rates can be explained by economic as 
well as institutional factors. Nowadays, there is a resurgence of interest for the link 
between economic performance and the efficiency of institutions. Differences in 
institutional efficiency may serve as a key explanation of the dispersion of growth rates 
and per capita income among countries (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012)). Empirical literature indicates a significant relationship between 
prosperity and low levels of corruption, economic and political independence and 
protection of civil and property rights. Thus, countries with advanced institutions tend 
to exhibit higher growth rates compared to those that are characterized by institutional 
inefficiencies. 
Among the several institutional factors that determine economic growth (e.g., 
corruption, economic freedom, political stability, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness), judicial efficiency seems to play a crucial role on economic 
performance, shaping the incentives of economic agents to take the ownership of 
significant investment projects and, thus, boosting economic growth dynamics. The 
growth-enhancing property of a well-functioned judicial system is established through 
the safeguarding of property rights and the enforcement of private contracts. 
Inefficiencies in the operation of judicial systems can hinder saving and investment 
decisions, failing to ensure the protection of their returns as they are exhausting the 
necessary funds used for financing investment plans. As a consequence, judicial system 
inefficiencies pose obstacles to the foreign direct investment inflows and/or increase 
capital flight towards safer and more stable legal environments. Moreover, judicial 
systems that are characterized by weak contract enforcement could increase transaction 
costs and have adverse effects on firms’ size and loan provision.  
Relying on the received literature of economics and law, we can propose that judicial 
efficiency not only endorse social values but also promote growth through the well-
functioning of financial markets (Bae & Goyal, 2009; Jappelli et al., 2002; Fabbri, 
2010), the support to entrepreneurship (Ippoliti et al., 2015) and investment (Lorenzani 
and Lucidi, 2014), and the upholding of the firm growth (Beck et al., 2006; Laeven and 
Woodruff, 2007). In light of the aforementioned growth-enhancing factors, we study 
 
 
whether judicial efficiency has a direct impact on economic growth. More specifically, 
we examine whether different levels of judicial efficiency in European union can 
explain the cross-country differences in per capita GDP growth.  
Measurement of judicial efficiency and productivity is not an easy task. Several 
methods have been proposed, relying either on the time needed to settle a case (e.g., 
Christensen and Szmer, 2012; Di Vita, 2010) or the number of cases completed by a 
court (e.g., Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004; Ramseyer, 2012) or clearance rates (e.g., 
Buscaglia and Ulen, 1997). In this paper, we investigate the direct impact of judicial 
efficiency on economic growth, using a new dataset drawn by the EU Justice 
Scoreboard, which provides, among others, data about the judicial efficiency for the 
member states of the European Union. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical 
literature has not studied the direct impact of judicial efficiency indicators on economic 
growth, especially for the European Union economies3. Thus, our paper tries to fill this 
gap by examining the impact of four different indicators of judicial efficiency on 
economic growth, using a new panel dataset for the European Union countries. Our aim 
is to highlight the growth-enhancing implications of the efficient judicial systems and 
to provide significant policy implications.  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the EU member states proceeded to significant 
structural reforms, aiming to mitigate the output losses and strengthening their 
economic fundamentals. Among the various structural reforms, European Union 
countries adopted significant justice reforms, aiming to increase the efficiency of their 
judicial systems by reducing the length of court proceedings as well as by restricting 
the excess caseload burden (either in terms of pending cases and/or incoming cases). 
Thus, our results justify the further implementation of reforms that boost judicial 
efficiency in the European Union countries, as a means of achieving higher growth 
rates.  
To evaluate the effects of judicial efficiency on economic growth in European Union’ 
countries, we estimate a static growth equation, controlling also for some standard 
growth determinants, that are widely used by the relevant empirical literature. We 
estimate alternative versions of our growth equation with OLS, using four different 
 
3
 The related empirical literature examines the impact of judicial efficiency on several economic 
outcomes, including, among others, the firms’ size, foreign direct investments and credit supply (see 
Section 2 for a detailed discussion about the related literature). 
 
 
indices of judicial efficiency, namely the clearance ratio, the disposition time, the 
incoming caseload and the pending caseload. Furthermore, in order to take into account, 
the potential endogeneity in our independent variables that arises in panel data 
estimations, we use instrumental variables (IV) estimation methods (in particular, two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation). Thus, our estimation controls for the potential 
endogeneity of all explanatory variables, using their lagged values as instruments. 
Finally, we construct two distinct composite indices of judicial inefficiency, using the 
four above-mentioned judicial efficiency indicators. This analysis helps us to identify 
an overall impact of the effectiveness of justice systems on economic growth. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Higher levels of judicial efficiency 
can actually promote growth. In other words, inefficiencies in the operation of judicial 
systems, measured alternatively as (a) lengthier court proceedings, (b) lower rates of 
clearance of accumulated unresolved cases, (c) increasing burden of pending cases and 
(d) a high inflow of new cases, that could be otherwise resort to alternative out-of-court 
resolution mechanisms, all undermine economic growth. Distortions in the operation of 
justice systems increase institutional uncertainty and compress business confidence, 
hampering several aspects of economic performance, hurting investment and creating 
productivity losses and, thus, hindering economic growth. Our results justify the 
continuation of judicial reforms in European Union members, aiming to safeguard the 
enforcement of private contracts and the security of property rights, facilitating the 
investment decisions, improving business confidence, raising productivity and 
supporting the European economies to achieve and sustain robust growth rates. Finally, 
we examine whether civil origin legal systems are relatively less growth enhancing than 
common law origin systems and find that civil origin systems do not underpin economic 
growth. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the related 
literature. In section 3 we present our data and the empirical strategy we employ. 
Section 4 presents and discusses our baseline results. Section 5 presents robustness 






2. Literature review and theoretical background  
A significant part of the received literature focuses on the study of the effects of well-
functioning judicial systems in economic outcomes, through the protection of property 
rights and the enforcement of contracts, providing empirical evidence of a strong 
positive relationship between efficient justice systems and various aspects of economic 
performance, such as firm size, foreign direct investments and credit supply4.  
A large part of the related literature examines the relationship between the efficiency 
and quality of judicial systems with the firms’ size. In general, an increase in the average 
size of firms implies productivity gains for the economy, fostering growth dynamics 
through the enhancement of scale economies. According to Lorizio and Gurrieri (2014), 
an inefficient judicial system may have adverse effects on several areas of businesses’ 
performance, hampering employment decisions (through failures in the enforcement of 
the employment legislation) and investment plans (through failures in the contract 
enforcement) and, thus, having a negative impact on firm size. Kumar et al. (2001), 
using firm-level data from 15 European economies, corroborate a positive relationship 
between the efficiency of judicial system and the average firm size, especially for the 
lower capital-intensive firms. In the same line, Beck et al. (2006), using data from 44 
developed economies, provide evidence of a positive relationship between the 
efficiency of the legal system and property rights protection with the firms’ size. 
Moreover, several country-specific studies confirm the positive implications of a well-
functional justice system to the firm size. For instance, Laeven and Woodruf (2007) 
find that the Mexican states with more efficient legal systems exhibit larger firms, 
mainly through a lower idiosyncratic risk faced by entrepreneurs which facilitates the 
smooth completion of their investment plans. Also, Garcia-Posada and Mora-
Sanguinetti (2013) confirm this positive relationship between firm size and judicial 
efficiency in Spain, while Giacomelli and Menon (2013) show that a reduction in trial 
length in Italy leads to an increase in the average Italian firm size. 
 
4
 A large strand of the literature investigates the demand and supply determinants of judicial efficiency. 
For example, see Carmignani and Giacomelli (2010), and Buonanno and Galizzi (2010) for studies on 
the demand-side determinants, while for supply-side drivers of judicial efficiency see, indicatively, 
Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999), Garoupa et al. (2010) and Voigt and El Bialy (2012), which examine 
several factors (including, among others, the size and specialization of courts, salaries of judicial 
personnel and presence of judicial councils and judges’ incentives). See also Palumbo et al. (2013) for a 
cross-country comparison across OECD economies, regarding the length of court proceedings, the 
accessibility to justice and the predictability of court decisions.  
 
 
A second pillar of the related literature focuses on the effect of well-performed judicial 
systems on foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign equity financing via FDI inflows 
is considered one of the major sources of capital inflows, fostering growth perspectives 
through the acceleration of technological progress and the adoption of innovative 
production techniques. Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) examine the role of institutions in 
the host and in the source country of FDI flows for OECD countries, providing evidence 
that a more efficient protection of civil and property rights, among others, tend to 
increase FDI inflows. Bellani (2014) finds also that countries with efficient justice 
systems attract more investment plans that are characterized by a higher degree of firm-
specific assets.  Lorenzani and Lucidi (2014) examine the impact of several judicial 
reforms that enhance judicial efficiency on FDI for the European Union members, 
suggesting that judicial efficiency gains may have profound effects on business activity 
and FDI. 
The third pillar of the related empirical literature is oriented towards the effects of 
inefficient justice systems on the smooth provision of credit as well as the level of 
interest rates. Borrowing restrictions and increases in the cost of lending due to 
inefficiencies of justice undermine growth perspectives. As Djankov et al. (2008) point 
out, debt financing is a crucial factor that determines the economic performance, 
allowing for the businesses to finance their investment plans and households to 
underpin their consumption expenditure. La Porta et al. (1997) find that the legal 
environment has positive effects on the size of capital markets across countries. Levine 
(1998) provides evidence that countries with legal codes that protect creditors’ rights, 
which are highly dependent on the legal origin, are characterized by more developed 
banking systems.  Djankov et al. (2008) show that more efficient debt enforcement of 
contracts is associated with improvements in debt markets, as measured by the ratio of 
private credit to GDP, as well as that the legal origin plays a crucial role on the 
efficiency level of debt enforcement. Bae and Goyal (2009) study the effects of 
variations across countries in legal protection of property and creditor rights on credit 
market, providing evidence that weak contract enforcement is related to compressed 
loan provision and elevated interest rates. Furthermore, several studies confirm the 
negative consequences of inefficient judicial systems on debt financing at a country 
level (e.g., Japelli et al. (2005) for Italy and Fabbri (2010) for Spain). 
 
 
Although the empirical literature has studied extensively the role of judicial efficiency 
on different aspects of economic performance, the direct effect of judicial performance 
on growth dynamics has not been studied extensively, with an exception of Feld and 
Voigt (2003) and Hayo and Voigt (2008). However, the former investigates the impact 
of judicial independence on growth dynamics, distinguishing between de iure and de 
facto indicators of judicial independence. The latter examines the role of procedural 
formalism on growth dynamics, contradicting the previous literature (e.g., Djankov et 
al. (2003)) that a high degree of formalism in judicial procedure is associated with lower 
economic growth rates, taking also into account the legal origin (for example, 
procedural formalism is higher in civil than in common law countries5). They find that 
several judicial procedures that safeguard the independence of the courts from external 
interventions and the fairness of legal proceedings (including, among others, the right 
to legal counsel and the right to appeal) are growth-enhancing, through the facilitation 
of transactions and the acceleration of investments. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we provide a description of our empirical methodology as well as the 
variables used in our regressions, focusing mainly on the variables of interest, i.e. the 
judicial efficiency indicators. 
3.1 Data Description: A Statistical Portrait of European 
judicial systems 
The dataset used in our analysis consists of an unbalanced panel of 27 European Union 
countries (see Table A1 in the Αppendix). Our sample covers the period 2010 to 2018. 
Judicial efficiency indicators are drawn from the European Union (EU) Justice 
Scoreboard. The data sources for the rest of our control variables include the Eurostat, 
the World Bank and the Penn World Table (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). 
 
5
 See, for example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) for a discussion 
about the ways in which the law origin and legal traditions shaped the legal framework for the protection 
of property rights across countries. For instance, the countries adopted the French Civil Law exhibit 
weaker protection of property rights as they give priority to the power of state and government operation, 
while the countries that embraced the British Common Law are characterized by flexible legal systems 
that facilitate private contracting.   
 
 
The EU Justice Scoreboard aims to provide useful insights and data for researchers and 
policymakers, facilitating the evaluation of quality and efficiency of judicial systems 
within the European Union.6. The Scoreboard is published on an annual basis, from 
2013 onwards, providing data from 2010 onwards, with an exception for 2011. The EU 
Justice Scoreboard uses various sources of information, with the largest part of the 
quantitative data to be derived from the Council of Europe Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ)7. The Scoreboard focuses on a number 
of indicators that measure the efficiency, quality and independence of justice in each 
EU country, focusing on non-criminal litigious cases (civil, commercial and 
administrative disputes). 
To estimate the effects of the efficient justice systems on economic growth, we consider 
four different indicators that gauge the degree of judicial efficiency, namely the 
clearance ratio, the disposition time, the incoming caseload and the pending caseload. 
All indices refer to first instance civil and commercial cases.8 
More specifically, the clearance rate is the ratio of the number of resolved cases over 
the number of incoming cases within a year. It measures the degree of performance of 
the judicial system regarding its incoming caseload. If the clearance rate is larger than 
100%, the courts are able to handle more cases than they received, thus, part of past 
accumulated cases is resolved. On the contrary, a clearance rate lower than 100%, 
implies that the judicial system resolves less cases than it receives, increasing the 
accumulated unresolved cases for the next year. The clearance rate is given by the 
following formula: 
𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (%) =  𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 × 100 
The disposition time measures the time necessary for a pending case to be solved in a 
court, taking into account the current pace of caseload of the courts in each country. In 
other words, it measures the length of judicial proceedings, i.e. the estimated time (in 
days) needed to resolve a case in court, meaning the time taken by the court to reach a 
 
6 See Dori (2015) for a detailed description of the scope and methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard. 
7 CEPEJ provides data about the quality and efficiency of judicial systems in EU countries, using 
available information from the member states. Data are distinguished between supply-side and demand-
side determinants of judicial efficiency (e.g., number of lawyers and judges, judicial budget, use of ICT 
applications, etc.) 
8 See, also, EU Justice Scoreboard 2020 for more details about the construction of the indices. 
 
 
decision at first instance. It equals to the total number of pending cases at the end of the 
reference period over the number of resolved cases during the same period, 
transforming the ratio to a number of days by multiplying with 365. Thus, disposition 
time is obtained by the following formula: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 × 365 
Furthermore, we rely on two additional judicial efficiency indicators, namely the 
incoming and pending caseload. The former measures the number of incoming cases 
within a year per 100 inhabitants. In other words, it captures the inflow of new cases 
within the reference year, which is expected to be negatively correlated with the level 
of judicial efficiency. The incoming caseload is computed using the following formula: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟100 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠  
The pending caseload measures the number of pending (unresolved) cases on 31 
December of the reference year per 100 inhabitants. It is a measure of the accumulated 
caseload of unresolved cases at the end of each year, which raises obstacles to the 
enforcement of contracts and the timely and efficient operation of courts and resolution 
of disputes. The pending caseload is determined as: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 31 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟100 𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠  
To investigate the relationship between the different indices of judicial efficiency and 
economic growth, we control for other growth determinants, that are widely used by 
the relevant empirical literature. The empirical literature on economic growth 
determinants (see e.g., Barro (2003)) has identified several drives of economic 
performance. We use per capita real GDP growth as our dependent variable. 
As explanatory variables in the growth equation, we use the government consumption 
as a share of GDP, used as a proxy to the government size, which usually has adverse 
effects on growth dynamics. Also, we include trade openness over GDP, computed as 
the sum of total exports and imports; a higher trade openness usually boosts economic 
growth.  Furthermore, we employ the inflation rate, measured as the growth rate of the 
harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), which usually hinder economic growth. 
Moreover, following the findings from the neoclassical growth theory that human 
capital promotes output growth dynamics, we use as an additional determinant the 
 
 
human capital index, drawn from Penn World Table, which is constructed based on 
years of schooling and returns to education. We use also population growth in percent; 
the literature usually suggests a negative relationship between per capita GDP growth 
and population growth. 
Finally, following Djankov et al. (2003) that procedural formalism has a significant 
impact on judicial efficiency and, thus, on the decisions of economic agents, we include 
in our specification time invariant legal origin dummies. To distinguish our sample of 
countries between the various origins of legal systems, we follow the categorization by 
Djankov et al. (2003), i.e. in Common law (British-law origin), Civil law (French-law 
origin), German law, Nordic law and former-socialist law countries (see Table A.2 in 
the appendix). As Levine (2005) points out, differences in law origin, shaped by 
historical factors (i.e. colonization, conquest and imitation), can explain the cross-
country differences in the protection of property rights and the enforcement of private 
contracts. For instance, the French civil law prioritizes the operation and the 
enhancement of the state and exhibits higher procedural formalism, putting less 
emphasis on the safeguarding of private property rights. On the contrary, common law 
(English legal origin) countries are characterized by a higher flexibility (and less 
formalism) and stronger support of private contracts.9  
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimations are presented in Table A.3 
in the appendix. A comparison of our data reveals a considerable cross-country 
variation. For instance, the mean per capita real GDP growth is 2%, with a standard 
deviation of 2.9%. The values of our dependent variable range between -9%, suffered 
by Greece, and 24%, enjoyed by Ireland. Regarding the standard control variables, it is 
evident also a cross-country variation (see Table A.3 in the appendix). Regarding the 
judicial efficiency indicators, the average clearance rate is 102.1%, ranging between the 
minimum vale of 55.6%, in Ireland and the maximum value of 181.6%, enjoyed by 
Luxembourg. The mean disposition time is 261.3 days. Malta has the maximum 
disposition time (849 days), while Luxembourg enjoys the lowest (53 days). Regarding 
the caseload, the mean value of the incoming caseload is 2.52 and that of the pending 
caseload is 1.74 per 100 inhabitants. Romania exhibits the highest incoming caseload 
(6.9 incoming cases per 100 inhabitants) and Finland the lowest (0.1 incoming cases 
 
9
 See Levine (2005) for a detailed review of the related literature that studies the factors that shaped the 
cross-country variations in legal systems.  
 
 
per 100 inhabitants). Italy has the highest pending caseload (6.3 pending cases per 100 
inhabitants), while Finland enjoys the lowest value (0.1 pending cases per 100 
inhabitants).  
Table A.4 in the appendix presents the correlation matrix, suggesting a simple statistical 
positive relationship between growth and clearance rate and a respective negative 
relationship of economic growth versus disposition time and caseload of pending cases. 
Although there is a positive correlation between growth and caseload of income cases, 
the majority of our growth specifications result in negative coefficients. 
 
3.2 Empirical Methodology 
We aim at empirically assessing the effects of different judicial indicators on economic 
growth in European Union countries by estimating variations of a static parsimonious 
growth equation, given by the following general specification: 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐽𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is real per capita GDP growth in country i at time 
t and the 𝐽𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 represents different indicators of judicial efficiency (clearance rate, 
disposition time, incoming caseload or pending caseload). The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 includes the 
rest control variables and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a zero-mean error term. The general specification (1) 
also includes the time-invariant dummy 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑖  to capture the effects of legal origin 
on economic performance.10 Moreover, equation (1) includes country fixed effects 𝑐𝑖 
and time effects 𝜏𝑡. Alternative specifications of (1) are examined, taking into account 
variations in country fixed effects and time effects as well as the incorporation of the 
legal origin dummies. 
We estimate alternative versions of equation (1) with OLS. Furthermore, in order to 
take into account, the potential endogeneity in our independent variables that arises in 
panel data estimations, we use IV estimation methods (in particular, two-stage least 
 
10
 Notice that the legal origin dummies are constant and do not change over time. Therefore, we do not 
include them in fixed-effect estimations, as their effects are captured by country fixed effects. We include 
legal origin dummies only in random effects estimations. This dummy takes the value of 1 when a country 
belongs to the respective group of countries that are originated from the specific legal origin. For more 
details regarding the distribution of countries across their law origin, see Djankov et al. (2003). 
 
 
squares (2SLS) estimation). Thus, our estimation controls for the potential endogeneity 
of all explanatory variables, using their lagged values as instruments. 
 
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
This paper examines the effects of four different indices of judicial efficiency on 
economic growth, using a standard growth model and controlling also for some widely-
used growth determinants. To do so, we estimate variations of equation (1) using OLS 
estimation methods. Moreover, we use an instrumental variable approach (2SLS) to 
control for potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Variations of (1) are 
estimated either with (a) country and time fixed effects (and without legal origin 
dummies, i.e., setting  𝛽3 = 0), (b) with country fixed effects and no time effects (again, 
without legal origin dummies, i.e., setting  𝛽3 = 0) and (c) with random effects, 
considering also the legal origin dummies (i.e., setting 𝛽3 ≠ 0). First, we present and 
discuss briefly the impact of the control variables on economic growth. Then, we focus 
on the growth effects of judicial efficiency indicators. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our 
empirical results from the OLS and IV estimations.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Our results regarding the effects of the control variables on economic growth are 
broadly in line with the related empirical literature (see, for instance, Barro (2003)). 
More specifically, our results (in OLS as well as in IV estimations) corroborate a strong 
negative and statistically significant relationship between government consumption (as 
% of GDP) and per capita growth, signifying that a higher government size (proxied by 
the government consumption ratio) hamper growth dynamics. Furthermore, we get 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for the trade openness (as a percent of 
GDP). Also, we confirm a negative statistically significant relationship between per 
capita GDP growth and inflation rate; the latter serves as an indicator of macroeconomic 
stability considering that inflationary pressures hinder economic outlook. We get also 
significant positive coefficients for human capital, confirming the theoretical 
predictions of the neoclassical growth models. Finally, our estimations provide 




Moving to our main variables of interest, our empirical findings suggest, in general, 
that inefficiencies in the operation of judicial systems, measured alternatively as (a) 
lengthier court proceedings, (b) lower rates of clearance of accumulated unresolved 
cases, (c) increasing burden of pending cases and (d) a high inflow of new cases, that 
could be otherwise resort to alternative out-of-court resolution mechanisms, all pose 
obstacles to economic growth. In other words, positive developments in judicial 
efficiency can promote the potential for a strong economic growth. There are also 
significant policy implications that indicate the increasing importance of structural 
reforms as a means of boosting investment and growth dynamics. Our results provide 
grounds for the justification of the implementation of further reforms in European 
Union members, aiming to enhance the efficiency of justice systems. Especially in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis, more efficient judicial systems, that safeguard the 
enforcement of private contracts and the security of property rights, can be growth-
enhancing, facilitating and incentivizing the domestic and external investment 
decisions and supporting the European economies to achieve and sustain robust growth 
rates. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
More specifically, in both OLS and IV estimations, we uncover a strong significant 
positive relationship between the clearance rate and per capita economic growth (across 
all specifications). A higher clearance rate means that the judicial system is 
characterized by increased capability to address more cases compared to incoming 
cases, which, in turn, leads to an acceleration of the resolution of past accumulated 
unresolved cases. The swift decrease of the accumulated burden of unresolved cases 
promotes the investment decisions, facilitates the ownership of investment plans and 
sends a signal to economic agents of a bold policy intention to confront past 
inefficiencies, easing the attraction of fresh investments.  
Regarding the impact of disposition time on economic growth, we get a negative 
statistically significant coefficient only in our IV estimation that includes random 
effects and legal origin dummies. Length trial proceedings are related to delayed 
resolution of commercial disputes, raising disincentives especially for foreign investors 
to choose the respective country among alternative investment destinations. 
 
 
Moreover, our results indicate a negative relationship between the caseload of incoming 
cases per 100 inhabitants and per capita GDP growth. An increased inflow of incoming 
cases in courts, instead of, for example, resort to out-of-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms, could trigger significant delays in court proceedings as well as in dispute 
resolution of civil and commercial cases, establishing a business-hostile environment 
and, thus, hindering economic growth.  
Finally, our results provide evidence of a negative impact of the caseload of pending 
cases per 100 inhabitants on economic growth (in both OLS and IV estimations). An 
increasing burden of accumulated unresolved cases within a year implies delays in the 
resolution of civil and commercial disputes, raising significant disincentives for new 
investment and, thus, posing obstacles to the achievement of robust economic growth 
rates. 
Finally, we test for the economic outcomes of a hypothesized basic historical difference 
between the styles of legal traditions, i.e., the policy-implementing focus of civil law 
versus the market-supporting focus of common law as documented by La Porta et al. 
(2008). Our results regarding the economic growth effects of legal origin dummies 
provide evidence for the existence of a strong negative relationship between economic 
growth and the civil (French) law origin (see columns 6, 9 and 12 in Table 1 and column 
9 in Table 2). This could be mainly attributed to the fact that the countries adopted civil 
law as their legal system tend to exhibit a weaker performance in the protection of 
private property rights, placing greater emphasis to the concentration of power by the 
state (see, e.g., Levine (2005)). Thus, civil law countries - which are characterized by a 
higher degree of formalism in judicial procedures - relegate the security of private 
property rights and the private enforcement of contracts to second place, hindering 
private investment and savings and, in turn, undermining the economic performance. 
Furthermore, we get significant negative coefficients for German legal origin and 
Nordic (Scandinavian) legal origin (see columns 6, 9 and 12 in Tables 1 and 2). 
Although the German and Scandinavian law embrace jurisprudence and are 
characterized by more independent judicial systems, commercial and civil dispute 
 
 
resolution in these countries tend to be more formalized than in common law 
countries.11 
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Composite Indices of Judicial Inefficiency 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings, using two different 
composite indices of judicial inefficiency. We construct these two different composite 
indicators, using two alternative techniques and based on the four aforementioned 
indices of judicial efficiency. This analysis helps us to identify an overall impact of the 
effectiveness of justice systems on economic growth. 
The former indicator of judicial inefficiency is constructed using the Principal 
Component Analysis (hereafter referred as PCA index). PCA has the advantage that 
concentrates closely related variables together, creating a new variable (which is called 
component). This kind of analysis allows us to create a new index of judicial efficiency, 
combining the four abovementioned indicators. The second composite index (hereafter 
referred as Composite Index) is constructed again using the four indices used in the 
previous sections. More specifically, we standardize the four indices so as to obtain a 
zero mean and a unit standard deviation. Then, the composite index is generated as the 
average of the standardized series.12 As depicted in Graphs 1 and 2, both composite 
indices seem to track the overall trend of per capita real GDP growth relatively well. 
[Insert Graphs 1 and 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Our results suggest a negative impact of judicial inefficiency on economic growth. In 
particular, as depicted in Table 3, we get negative significant coefficients of both 
indices of judicial inefficiency for both OLS and IV estimations. Thus, our findings 
 
11 According to Djankov et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) the common law countries put larger emphasis 
on the protection of private property rights and are more flexible regarding the adherence to formal 
procedures. Thus, we expected that common law origin could imply potential output gains. However, 
although the majority of the coefficients for the common law origin dummy are positive, we do not get 
statistically significant results.  
12 All indices of judicial efficiency used in this paper, except from the clearance rate, indicate that a rise 
in the index reflects a deterioration in judicial performance. Thus, in both cases, we first transpose the 
clearance rate in order to be compatible with the remaining three indices and, then, we proceed to the 
generation of the composite index. 
 
 
corroborate the widespread view that dysfunctional judicial systems, that fail to 
safeguard the security of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, raise 
significant obstacles to economic growth dynamics and have detrimental effects on 
productivity. Distortions in the operation of justice systems (for example, lengthy trial 
proceedings, a high degree of procedural formalism that undermines the productivity 
of courts, organizational issues, inadequacies in the training of the judicial personnel as 
well as the lack of innovative ICT mechanisms) increase the institutional uncertainty 
and compress business confidence, hampering several aspects of economic 
performance.    
More specifically, a failure to safeguard property rights can undermine saving and 
investment through a weak protection of their returns, raise impediments to the 
attraction of foreign direct investment and create capital outflows, deteriorating the 
business climate and eliminating the necessary funds used for financing investment 
plans. Furthermore, a weak private contract enforcement could heighten transaction 
costs, creating disincentives for the private agents to participate in financial 
transactions, pose obstacles to the enhancement of scale economies and the enlargement 
of firms’ size and raise liquidity constraints, compressing loan provision and increasing 
interest rates. 
 
5.2 Dynamic specification 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our baseline results, studying an 
alternative dynamic specification of equation (1). More specifically, we use a dynamic 
version of our initial specification, adding a lagged term of our dependent variable (i.e., 
per capita real GDP growth) in the set of our explanatory variables. Thus, our 
specification in transformed to: 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (2) 
Estimating equation (2) by least squares will provide biased estimates due to the 
endogeneity of our control variables as well as the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor (Nickel (1981)). Thus, we employ the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation developed for dynamic panel data, as introduced by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). We use as instruments the 
 
 
lagged values of our explanatory variables, so as to control for the potential endogeneity 
of all explanatory variables.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our results from the GMM estimations confirm our previous findings that efficient 
judicial systems are growth enhancing. More specifically, as depicted in Table 4, we 
get a significant positive coefficient for the clearance rate and significant negative 
coefficients for the disposition time, the caseload of incoming cases and the caseload 
of pending cases per 100 inhabitants.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Cross-country differences in economic growth rates can be attributed to both economic 
and institutional factors. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the EU member states 
adopted significant structural reform agendas, directing their reform effort to policies 
that offset the output losses occurred during the previous decade and enhance their 
economic fundamentals and their resilience to future shocks. Among the various 
structural reforms adopted, European Union economies proceeded to judicial reforms, 
through various ways (e.g., by reducing the length of court proceedings and/or by 
restricting the excess caseload burden, either in terms of pending cases and/or incoming 
cases), aiming to increase the efficiency of their justice systems. 
The empirical literature has studied the role of judicial efficiency on different aspects 
of economic performance, including, among others, the firm size, foreign direct 
investments and credit supply. However, to the best of our knowledge, the direct effect 
of judicial performance on growth, especially for the European Union economies, has 
not been studied extensively. Thus, our paper tries to fill this gap by examining the 
impact of four different indicators of judicial efficiency provided by European 
Commission (through the EU Justice Scoreboard) on economic growth, using a new 
panel dataset for the European Union countries. Moreover, we construct two alternative 
composite indices of judicial inefficiency, based on the available information and data 
provided by European Commission, and examine their impact on economic growth. 
Our results corroborate that inefficiencies in the operation of judicial systems, measured 
alternatively as (a) lengthier court proceedings, (b) lower rates of clearance of 
 
 
accumulated unresolved cases, (c) increasing burden of pending cases and (d) a high 
inflow of new cases, all pose obstacles to economic growth. In other words, 
improvements in judicial efficiency can be growth enhancing; this supports the further 
adoption of judicial reforms in European Union members, aiming to safeguard the 
enforcement of private contracts and the security of property rights, facilitating the 
investment decisions, improving business confidence, raising productivity and 
supporting the European economies to achieve and sustain robust growth rates. 
Additionally, our empirical evidence showed that legal origin, civil versus common 
law, matter for economic growth as it is associated with a higher degree of procedural 





















Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2005): Institutions as the Fundamental 
Cause of Long-run Growth, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic 
Growth (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 
 
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty. 
 
Arellano, M. And S. Bond (1991): Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, 277-297. 
 
Arellano, M. And O. Bover (1995): Another Look at the Instrumental Variable 
Estimation of Error Component Models, Journal of Econometrics, 68, (1), 29-51. 
 
Bae, K. H. and V. K. Goyal (2009): Creditor rights, enforcement, and bank loans. 
Journal of Finance, 64(2), 823–860 
 
Barro, R. (2003): Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of Countries, Annals of 
Economics and Finance, 4, 231-274. 
 
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic (2006): The Influence of Financial 
and Legal Institutions on Firm Size, Journal of Banking & Finance: 2995–3015. 
 
Bellani, M. (2014): Judicial Efficiency and Foreign Direct Investments: Evidence from 
OECD countries, Mimeo.  
 
Benassy-Quere, A., M. Coupet and T. Mayer (2007): Institutional Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investment, The World Economy, 30 (5), 764-782.  
 
Beenstock, M., and Y.  Haitovsky (2004): Does the appointment of judges increase the 
output of the judiciary? International Review of Law and Economics, 24(3), 351–369. 
 
 
Buonanno, P. and M.M. Galizzi (2010): Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the Supplier-
Induced-Demand Hypothesis for Italian Courts of Justice. Working Papers 2010.52, 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. 
 
Buscaglia, E. and M. Dakolias (1999): Comparative International Study of Court 
Performance Indicators, Legal and Judicial Reform Series, World Bank Publications 




Buscaglia, E.  and T. Ulen (1997): A quantitative assessment of the efficiency of the 





Carmignani, A. and S. Giacomelli (2010):  Too many lawyers? Litigation in Italian civil 
courts. Temi di discussione (Working Papers) 745. Banca d’Italia. 
 
Christensen, R. K., and J. Szmer (2012): Examining the efficiency of the U.S. courts of 
appeals: Pathologies and prescriptions. International Review of Law and Economics, 
32(1), 30–37. 
 
Di Vita, G. (2010): Production of laws and delays in court decisions. International 
Review of Law and Economics, 30(3), 276–281. 
 
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2003): "Courts", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 453-517. 
 
Djankov, S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer (2008): Debt Enforcement Around 
the World, Journal of Political Economy, 116(6): 1105-49. 
 
Dori, A. (2015): The EU Justice Scoreboard – Judicial Evaluation as a New Governance 
Tool, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg, Working Paper (2). 
 
Fabbri, D. (2010): Law Enforcement and Firm Financing: Theory and Evidence, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4): 776-816. 
 
Feld, L. and S. Voigt (2003): Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross 
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, European Journal of Political 
Economy 19: 497–527. 
 
Hayo, B. and S. Voigt (2008): The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic 
Growth, CESifo Working Paper Νο. 2514. 
 
García-Posada, M. and J.S. Mora-Sanguinetti (2013): Firm Size and Judicial Efficacy: 
Evidence for the new civil procedures in Spain. Documentos de Trabajo 1303. Banco 
de España. 
 
Garoupa, N., N. Jorgensen and P. Vazquez (2010): Assessing the Argument for 
Specialised Courts: Evidence from Family Courts in Spain, International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family, 24 (1): 54-66. 
 
Giacomelli, S. and C. Menon (2013): Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency in Italy: 
Evidence from the Neighbour's Tribunal, Temi di discussione (Working Papers) 898. 
Banca d’Italia. 
 
Ippoliti, R., Melcarne, A., and G. B.  Ramello (2015): Judicial efficiency and 
entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of European legal systems, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 40(1), 75–94. 
 
Jappelli, T., M. Pagano and M. Bianco (2005): Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial 
Enforcement on Credit Markets, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 37(2): 223-244. 
 
Kumar, B., R. Rajan and L. Zingales (2001): What Determines Firm’s Size, NBER 




Laeven, L. and C. Woodruff (2007): The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership 
and Firm Size, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89: 601-614. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999): The Quality of 
Government, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 222–279. 
 
LaPorta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2008): The Economic Consequences 
of Legal Origins, Journal of Economic Literature, 46 (2), 285-332. 
 
Levine, R. (1998): The Legal Environment, Banks and Long-Run Economic Growth, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30 (3), 596-613. 
 
Levine, R. (2005): Law, Endowments and Property Rights, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19 (3), 61-88. 
 
Lorizio, M. and A.R. Gurrieri (2014): Efficiency of Justice and Economic Systems, 
Procedia Economics and Finance, 17, 104-112.  
 
Nickel, S. (1981): Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica, Vol. 
49 (6), 1417-1426. 
 
Palumbo, G., Giupponi, G., Nunziata, L., and J. Mora-Sanguinetti (2013): The 
Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-country Data and Empirics, OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper, No. 1060. 
 
Qian, J. and P. Strahan (2007): How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: 
The Case of Bank Loans, Journal of Finance, 62(6), 2803–2834. 
 
The 2020 EU Justice Scoreboard, European Commission, July 2020.  
 
Voigt, S. and N. El Bialy (2012): Identifying the Determinants of Judicial Performance: 









Table 1: Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth (OLS Estimations) 
Efficiency Indicators: Clearance rate Disposition time Caseload (incoming cases) Caseload (pending cases) 
Dependent variabe: Real Per 
Capita GDP Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Control Variables                         
Constant 
-0.188** -0.263 0.055 0.129 -0.238 0.075** 0.079 -0.029 0.127*** 0.171 -0.138 0.131** 
(0.094) (0.217) (0.051) (0.093) (0.173) (0.037) (0.121) (0.245) (0.051) (0.114) (0.156) (0.052) 
Government expenditure (% 
GDP) 
-0.571* -0.427* -0.406*** -0.533*** -0.415*** -0.290*** -0.708 -0.673* -0.446*** -0.463** -0.355*** -0.335*** 
(0.299) (0.217) (0.144) (0.199) (0.108) (0.071) (0.451) (0.397) (0.164) (0.198) (0.111) (0.076) 
Trade openness ( %  GDP) 
0.024 -0.002 0.008** 0.028** -0.003 0.007* 0.022 0.004 0.005 0.028** 0.002 -0.003 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.003) (0.013) (0.017) (0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.003) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.016 -0.029* -0.041* -0.027 -0.029* -0.041* -0.019 -0.035** -0.043** -0.037* -0.035** -0.045** 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) 
Human capital 
0.075** 0.103 0.007 -0.011 0.108** 0.003 0.021 0.062 -0.001 -0.023 -0.077* -0.032 
(0.036) (0.064) (0.009) (0.023) (0.053) (0.011) (0.025) (0.064) (0.010) (0.027) (0.046) (0.010) 
Population growth 
-0.073 -0.055 -0.073** -0.066 -0.057 -0.063* -0.066 -0.032 -0.051 -0.065 -0.057* -0.041 
(0.053) (0.048) (0.033) (0.048) (0.041) (0.037) (0.052) (0.049) (0.032) (0.042) (0.031) (0.032) 
Common (dummy) 
    0.011     0.001     -0.002     0.008 
    (0.027)     (0.021)     (0.025)     (0.013) 
Civil (dummy) 
    -0.010     -0.011***     -0.011*     -0.012*** 
    (0.006)     (0.003)     (0.006)     (0.003) 
German (dummy) 
    -0.044     -0.009     -0.014*     -0.025** 




    0.016     0.008     0.006     -0.011 
    (0.011)     (0.006)     (0.013)     (0.012) 
Judicial Efficiency Indicators 
                        
Clearance rate 
0.049*** 0.038*** 0.021*                   
(0.014) (0.006) (0.011)                   
Disposition time 
      0.003 -0.007 -0.032             
      (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)             
Caseload (incoming cases) 
            -0.004* -0.007*** -0.004**       
            (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)       
Caseload (pending cases) 
                  -0.007** -0.011*** -0.011** 
                  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Country dummies YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Time dummies YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Number of obs 189 189 189 180 180 180 194 194 194 180 180 180 
Adj. R^2 0.54 0.45 0.17 0.57 0.44 0.18 0.50 0.42 0.19 0.58 0.49 0.28 
Note for Table 1: The table reports estimations of equation (1) for the four different measures of judicial efficiency and for different specifications of deterministic controls and estimation methods. 
Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) report results from OLS models that include country and time fixed effects and no legal origin dummies. Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) report results from OLS 
models that include country-fixed effects only and no legal origin dummies. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) report results from OLS models that include random effects and legal origin dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Table 2: Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth (IV Estimations) 
Efficiency Indicators: Clearance rate Disposition time Caseload (incoming cases) Caseload (pending cases) 
Dependent variabe: Real Per 
Capita GDP Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Control Variables                         
Constant 
-0.335 -1.290*** -1.067 0.355** -0.621** -0.387 0.238 -0.684** 0.169 0.422** -0.506** -0.182 
(0.410) (0.454) (0.892) (0.154) (0.238) (0.372) (0.313) (0.270) (0.164) (0.188) (0.222) (0.362) 
Government expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
1.234 1.782 1.561 0.025 0.113 2.315* -0.035 0.564 -0.375 -0.196 0.343 1.048 
(1.475) (1.611) (1.802) (0.332) (0.324) (1.192) (0.862) (0.645) (0.789) (0.295) (0.293) (0.786) 
Trade openness ( % of GDP) 
-0.032 -0.115 -0.127 -0.044 -0.108 -0.028 -0.068 -0.110 -0.019 -0.031 -0.084 -0.022 
(0.057) (0.119) (0.120) (0.039) (0.091) (0.075) (0.051) (0.085) (0.015) (0.032) (0.082) (0.036) 
Inflation 
0.051 -0.044 -0.043 -0.010 -0.048** -0.009 0.001 -0.095*** -0.019 0.011 -0.050** -0.033*** 
(0.131) (0.032) (0.029) (0.048) (0.024) (0.061) (0.124) (0.035) (0.062) (0.042) (0.024) (0.011) 
Human capital 
0.033 0.324*** 0.249* -0.084* 0.241** 0.026* -0.025 0.251** -0.004 -0.096 0.185** 0.025 
(0.065) (0.111) (0.135) (0.043) (0.098) (0.015) (0.058) (0.101) (0.013) (0.057) (0.081) (0.041) 
Population growth 
-0.253 -0.279 -0.375 -0.385* -0.411* 0.144 -0.417 -0.219 0.189 -0.409* -0.235 -0.114 
(0.254) (0.192) (0.626) (0.203) (0.211) (0.819) (0.347) (0.202) (0.161) (0.206) (0.168) (0.494) 
Common (dummy) 
    0.646     0.096     -0.016     0.125 
    (1.125)     (0.116)     (0.048)     (0.157) 
Civil (dummy) 
    0.349     0.002     -0.046**     0.038 
    (0.977)     (0.074)     (0.019)     (0.086) 
German (dummy) 
    -0.394     -0.023     -0.111*     0.054 
    (1.137)     (0.289)     (0.065)     (0.239) 
Nordic (dummy) 
    -0.399     -0.348***     -0.029     -0.229*** 
    (0.447)     (0.115)     (0.137)     (0.077) 
Judicial Efficiency Indicators 




0.053* 0.072 0.071                   
(0.029) (0.066) (0.057)                   
Disposition time 
      0.033 -0.019 -0.218*             
      (0.030) (0.031) (0.111)             
Caseload (incoming cases) 
            -0.009 -0.022** -0.002       
            (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)       
Caseload (pending cases) 
                  0.002 -0.145* -0.025** 
                  (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) 
Country dummies YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Time dummies YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Number of obs 136 136 136 128 128 128 140 140 140 128 128 128 
Prob (J-statistic) 0.05 0.22 0.96 0.77 0.18 0.97 0.35 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.19 0.93 
Note for Table 2: The table reports estimations of equation (1) for the four different measures of judicial efficiency and for different specifications of deterministic controls and estimation methods. 
Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) report results from 2SLS models that include country and time fixed effects and no legal origin dummies. Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) report results from 2SLS 
models that include country-fixed effects only and no legal origin dummies. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) report results from 2SLS models that include random effects and legal origin dummies. 












Table 3: Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
Efficiency Indicators: PCA index of Judicial Inefficiency  Composite index of Judicial Inefficiency  
  OLS  IV OLS  IV 
Dependent variabe: Real Per 
Capita GDP Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Control Variables                         
Constant 
0.122 -0.178 0.107*** 0.431* -0.511** 0.147 0.098 -0.189 0.098*** 0.281 -0.546** -0.289 
(0.102) (0.166) (0.036) (0.242) (0.254) (0.152) (0.094) (0.169) (0.031) (0.213) (0.243) (0.399) 
Government expenditure (% 
GDP) 
-0.420** -0.303*** -0.316*** -0.244 0.097 -0.122 -0.432** -0.309*** -0.298*** 0.015 0.152 0.979 
(0.182) (0.096) (0.079) (0.309) (0.199) (0.645) (0.182) (0.098) (0.079) (0.262) (0.231) (0.919) 
Trade openness ( %  GDP) 
0.033** 0.005 -0.003 -0.038 -0.093 -0.041** 0.035*** 0.006 -0.002 -0.018 -0.074 -0.011 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.004) (0.042) (0.089) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.003) (0.037) (0.081) (0.044) 
Inflation 
-0.041* -0.032** -0.042** 0.018 -0.043* -0.013 -0.041* -0.031** -0.041** -0.007 -0.042* -0.018* 
(0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.044) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.039) (0.022) (0.009) 
Human capital 
-0.016 0.079 -0.003 -0.092 0.199** -0.006 -0.009 0.082 -0.002 -0.070 0.198** 0.039 
(0.026) (0.050) (0.009) (0.061) (0.092) (0.005) (0.024) (0.052) (0.008) (0.054) (0.088) (0.038) 
Population growth 
-0.065* -0.063** -0.057* -0.428* -0.354 0.226 -0.062* -0.058* -0.057** -0.307 -0.291 -0.284 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.237) (0.217) (0.174) (0.036) (0.031) (0.027) (0.205) (0.188) (0.620) 
Common (dummy) 
    0.017     0.007     0.017     0.183 
    (0.013)     (0.044)     (0.013)     (0.209) 
Civil (dummy) 
    -0.012***     -0.025**     -0.012***     0.056 
    (0.003)     (0.013)     (0.004)     (0.109) 
German (dummy) 
    -0.025***     -0.108*     -0.023***     0.107 
    (0.009)     (0.055)     (0.008)     (0.741) 
Nordic (dummy)     -0.012     -0.111     -0.011     -0.194*** 
 
 
    (0.009)     (0.073)     (0.008)     (0.052) 
Judicial Efficiency Indicators 
                        
PCA index of Judicial 
Inefficiency  
-0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.010* -0.021***             
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)             
Composite index of 
Judicial Inefficiency  
            -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.006 -0.021** -0.045*** 
            (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) 
Country dummies YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Time dummies YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Number of obs 180 180 180 128 128 128 180 180 180 128 128 128 
Adj. R^2 0.61 0.51 0.31       0.62 0.51 0.31       
Prob (J-statistic)       0.53 0.27 0.31       0.31 0.21 0.89 
Note for Table 3: The table reports estimations of equation (1) for the two different composite indices of judicial inefficiency and for different specifications of deterministic controls and estimation 
methods. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (7), (8), (9) report results from OLS models for both indices for alternative specifications of country and time fixed effects and legal origin dummies. Columns 
(4), (5), (6) and (10), (11), (12) report results from IV estimations (2SLS models) for both indices for alternative specifications of country and time fixed effects and legal origin dummies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4: Dependent variable: Real Per Capita GDP Growth (Dynamic version - GMM Estimations) 
Efficiency Indicators: Clearance rate Disposition time Caseload (incoming cases) Caseload (pending cases) 
Dependent variabe: Real Per 
Capita GDP Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Control Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant 
-0.141 -1.270*** 0.394 0.387** -0.399** -0.114* 0.217 -0.749** 0.077 0.374* -0.465*** 0.048 
(0.299) (0.409) (0.338) (0.192) (0.154) (0.064) (0.149) (0.293) (0.092) (0.211) (0.144) (0.107) 
Real per capita GDP growth 
(lagged term) 
-0.172 -0.052 0.065 0.168 0.330* 0.487*** -0.086 -0.057 0.225 0.242* 0.195 0.399** 
(0.319) (0.326) (0.336) (0.163) (0.170) (0.174) (0.246) (0.249) (0.309) (0.144) (0.147) (0.198) 
Government expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
0.515 1.472 0.295 -0.107 0.315 0.749 -0.008 0.681 -0.026 0.034 0.518* 0.277 
(0.665) (1.389) (0.842) (0.322) (0.292) (0.493) (0.331) (0.635) (0.283) (0.322) (0.273) (0.409) 
Trade openness ( % of GDP) 
-0.048 -0.125 -0.111 -0.055** -0.113 -0.014 -0.037 -0.080 -0.017 -0.026*** -0.069 -0.021 
(0.083) (0.152) (0.126) (0.026) (0.076) (0.014) (0.044) (0.075) (0.017) (0.007) (0.070) (0.013) 
Inflation 
0.078 -0.050** -0.024 0.015 -0.040*** -0.021 0.009 -0.095*** -0.035 0.013 -0.042** -0.034 
(0.117) (0.024) (0.096) (0.047) (0.014) (0.024) (0.089) (0.023) (0.040) (0.032) (0.016) (0.027) 
Human capital 
0.022 0.337*** 0.012 -0.083* 0.158** 0.012** -0.032 0.252*** 0.002 -0.102 0.152** -0.005 
(0.075) (0.121) (0.029) (0.046) (0.074) (0.005) (0.027) (0.089) (0.008) (0.066) (0.065) (0.005) 
Population growth 
-0.464 -0.350 1.411 -0.392** -0.323** 0.147 -0.382 -0.143 0.171 -0.345** -0.165 0.150** 
(0.397) (0.304) (1.541) (0.185) (0.155) (0.213) (0.283) (0.220) (0.004) (0.180) (0.129) (0.064) 
Common (dummy) 
    -0.235     -0.016     -0.017     -0.011 
    (0.210)     (0.054)     (0.017)     (0.019) 
Civil (dummy) 
    -0.166     -0.027     -0.038     -0.018*** 
    (0.179)     (0.028)     (0.023)     (0.004) 
German (dummy) 
    -0.505     -0.057     -0.077     -0.051 
    (0.587)     (0.054)     (0.058)     (0.033) 
Nordic (dummy) 
    -0.342     -0.138*     -0.070     -0.103*** 
    (0.336)     (0.082)     (0.053)     (0.038) 
 
 
Judicial Efficiency Indicators 
                        
Clearance rate 
0.063* 0.085 -0.191                   
(0.033) (0.065) (0.143)                   
Disposition time 
      0.026 -0.002 -0.037**             
      (0.039) (0.029) (0.017)             
Caseload (incoming cases) 
            -0.011** -0.024*** -0.003       
            (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)       
Caseload (pending cases) 
                  0.007 -0.009 -0.012* 
                  (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Country dummies YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Time dummies YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Number of obs 136 136 136 128 128 128 140 140 140 128 128 128 
Prob (J-statistic) 0.13 0.34 0.86 0.80 0.54 0.93 0.51 0.58 0.12 0.73 0.25 0.55 
Note for Table 4: The table reports estimations of equation (1) for the four different measures of judicial efficiency and for different specifications of deterministic controls and estimation 
methods. Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) report results from GMM models that include country and time fixed effects and no legal origin dummies. Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) report results 
from GMM models that include country-fixed effects only and no legal origin dummies. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) report results from GMM models that include random effects and legal 
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A.1 List of countries and summary statistics 














Ireland   
 
 




Common England, Ireland, Cyprus, Malta 
Civil Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain  
German Austria,Germany 
Nordic Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
Former 
Socialist 
Russia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary. Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania 












































 Mean 0.02 0.20 1.30 0.01 3.25 0.02 102.10 261.33 2.52 1.74 -0.05 0.00  
 Median 0.02 0.20 1.13 0.01 3.27 0.02 101.30 207.50 2.30 1.60 -0.10 -0.10  
 Maximum 0.24 0.27 4.08 0.06 3.82 0.33 181.60 849.00 6.90 6.30 2.51 4.73  
 Minimum -0.09 0.12 0.52 -0.02 2.36 -0.28 55.60 53.00 0.10 0.10 -1.63 -2.92  
 Std. Dev. 0.03 0.03 0.71 0.14 0.28 0.09 14.18 149.24 1.64 1.39 0.65 1.43  
 Skewness 1.34 0.37 1.83 0.38 -0.65 0.52 1.11 1.17 0.94 1.00 0.75 0.67  
 Kurtosis 15.90 2.80 6.73 3.05 3.83 4.73 11.95 4.16 3.51 3.62 4.08 3.26  
 
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 243 189 180 194 180 180 180 
 












Table A.4 Correlation Matrix                   






















GDP (per capita growth) 1.00 -0.31 0.22 -0.13 -0.12 -0.18 0.17 -0.20 0.00 -0.23 
Goverment consumption  -0.31 1.00 -0.35 -0.10 0.35 0.16 -0.13 -0.05 -0.46 -0.29 
Trade openess  0.22 -0.35 1.00 0.08 0.08 0.51 0.26 -0.12 -0.24 -0.29 
Inflation -0.13 -0.10 0.08 1.00 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.09 
Human Capital  -0.12 0.35 0.08 -0.12 1.00 0.31 -0.03 -0.11 -0.39 -0.32 
Population growth  -0.18 0.16 0.51 0.02 0.31 1.00 0.12 0.05 -0.46 -0.23 
Clearance rate 0.17 -0.13 0.26 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 1.00 -0.13 -0.18 -0.07 
Disposition time -0.20 -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 0.05 -0.13 1.00 0.05 0.71 
Incoming caselod  0.00 -0.46 -0.24 0.03 -0.39 -0.46 -0.18 0.05 1.00 0.63 
Pending caseload -0.23 -0.29 -0.29 -0.09 -0.32 -0.23 -0.07 0.71 0.63 1.00 
 
 
Table A.5 Correlation between GDP per capita and composite indices of 
judicial inefficiency 
















PCA index -0.23 1.00 PCA index -0.25 1.00 
 
